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BAKER AND SOME RECIPES FOR DISASTER: ON DOMA,




In Baker v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court held that
Missouri was not constitutionally required to give full faith and
credit to a Michigan injunction barring an individual from testifying
against General Motors without the latter's consent.' The opinion is
important for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it
helps to clarify full faith and credit jurisprudence. For example, the
Court made clear that states are not free to refuse to give full faith
and credit to the judgments of sister states, even if the enforcement
of those judgments would violate an important public policy of the
enforcing state.2
There are some issues, however, which must be clarified, such
as whether the full faith and credit obligations imposed on the states
are required by the Constitution or, instead, by Congress. The Su-
preme Court may soon address this issue in the domestic relations
context when the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act'
("DOMA") is challenged or, perhaps, after Congress has acceded to
demands to create an exception which allows states to refuse to
recognize the no-fault divorce decrees of sister states. Such acts
might be held unconstitutional, however, even without addressing
Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to return
01998 Mark Strasser. All Rights Reserved.
118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
2 The Court distinguished the issue in Baker from a case in which full faith and
credit would be required, pointing out that in the instant case, Michigan did not have
the 'authority to shield a witness from another jurisdiction's subpoena power in a case
involving persons and causes outside Michigan's governance.' Id. at 667.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) (stating that states are not required to recognize same-
sex marriages validly celebrated in other states and defining marriage for federal purpos-
es as the union of one man and one woman).
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extra sovereignty to the states. Bracketing whether Congress has this
power, the Court will also have to decide whether states are consti-
tutionally permitted to refuse to recognize marriages valid in the
states of celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage. States
must not be permitted to refuse to recognize such marriages, since
any other holding by the Court wguld significantly eviscerate due
process and privileges and immunities protections.
Part I of this Article argues that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
empowers Congress to increase but not to decrease the full faith
and credit due to sister states' judicial proceedings. Part II suggests
that the Full Faith and Credit and the Due Process Clauses prohibit
Congress from passing DOMA and might also prohibit Congress
from passing legislation requiring states to employ the laws of the
marital domicile to determine the conditions under which the par-
ties might divorce. This Article concludes that the Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses must be understood to: (1) preclude
the passage of DOMA, (2) prevent states from refusing to recognize
marriages valid in the states of celebration and domicile at the time
of the marriage, and (3) prohibit Congress from passing legislation
requiring states to supplant their own divorce laws with the fault-
only divorce laws of other states. Unless the above limitations are
recognized and accepted, we will have a very different type of
federal union than most individuals would either imagine or desire.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Article IV of the United States Constitution provides that "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." 4 The Article
further provides that "Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."'
Yet, it is not clear how Article IV should be interpreted since
the text specifies both that full faith and credit shall be given and
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
' Id.
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that Congress may specify the effect of authenticated acts, records,
and judgments.' An interpretation of the text should be offered
which nullifies the language of neither provision.7
A. On Giving Full Faith and Credit to Judgments
Regrettably, the U.S. Supreme Court has not made sufficiently
clear what is encompassed by the congressional power to prescribe
effects-whether, for example, it merely involves setting up the
mechanism whereby the full faith and credit obligations will be
enforced or whether, instead, it allows Congress to determine how
much credit is due. The former would mean that Congress has been
authorized to streamline the system, making it easier for judgments
to be given their due, but not to affect the amount of credit that the
judgments would be given. The latter would mean that Congress
could affect how much credit is given to particular judgments.
The Court has noted that the Constitution requires that "'not
some but full' faith and credit be given judgments of a state court."8
As made clear in Johnson v. Muelberger,9 the "faith and credit giv-
en is not to be niggardly but generous, full."'" These comments
suggest that Congress is not empowered to lessen the amount of
credit that one state is to give to another state's judgment. However,
that would not help determine whether Congress has only the pow-
er to set up a more efficient mechanism or, in addition, the power
to affect how much credit will be given as long as Congress does
not decrease what is due.
In M'Elmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen," the Court explained,
"The authenticity of a judgment and its effect, depend upon the law
made in pursuance of the Constitution; the faith and credit due to it
as the judicial proceeding of a state, is given by the Constitution,
6 See infra notes 11-63 and accompanying text (offering differing interpretations of
one part of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, namely, the Effects Clause).
I See Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the 'Effects Clause' of Article
IV, Section I and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV.
307, 323 (1998) (recognizing tension between claim that records, judgments, and acts
must be given full faith and credit and claim that Congress has the power to prescribe
the effects of one state's law in another state).
* Williams v. North Carolina (Williams ), 317 U.S. 287, 294 (1942) (quoting Davis
v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938)).
9 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
10 Id. at 584.
1 38 U.S. 312 (1839).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
independently of all legislation." 2 The Court distinguished be-
tween the faith and credit due to a judgment, which is prescribed
by the Constitution independent of congressional legislation, and
the judgment's authenticity and effect, which are dependent upon
the relevant congressional legislation. Yet, it is not immediately
clear what distinction the Court was trying to capture, since the
Court distinguished between the full faith and credit due to a judg-
ment on the one hand and the effect of the judgment on the other.
First, it is important to establish what the Court was not doing.
The Court was not distinguishing between the judgment's effect in
the state in which it was issued and the judgment's effect in sister
states. On the contrary, whether the Court was analyzing the faith
and credit due to an authenticated judgment or, instead, was exam-
ining the effect of such a judgment, the Court was discussing the
obligations of one state when a sister state had already issued a
judgment on the merits with respect to a particular controversy.
The M'Elmoyle Court suggested that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, itself, made "judgments out of the state in which they are
rendered ... only evidence in a sister state."1 3 Yet, it may be mis-
leading to describe an authenticated judgment as only evidence in a
sister state since the issue at hand is, "Evidence as opposed to
what?" Insofar as an authenticated judgment from a sister state
would be conclusive evidence on the merits,"4 it might be quite
misleading to describe a sister state's judgment as mere evidence.
1. The Mechanics of Full Faith and Credit
One interpretation of the Effects Clause is that the Constitution
has given Congress the power to decide what kind rather than how
much of an effect a sister state's judgment is to have. According to
this interpretation, Congress is not to address whether the judgment
will be given credit or how much credit it will be given but rather
who will be required to ensure that the foreign judgment will be
given its due. For example, Congress could set up a registration
system to preclude the need to have a new trial in a sister state in
12 Id. at 324-325.
13 Id. at 325; see also Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 668 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
14 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1312 (5th ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1994) (1891) (discussing controversy
whether the evidence should be viewed as conclusive or prima facie).
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order for a foreign judgment to be given credit.'" Such a system
would be more efficient 6 since "execution or other process under
the law of the second state could issue directly upon the registered
judgment, without necessity for new action with new service and all
its attendant delays and disadvantages." 7
The M'Elmoyle Court suggested that the section of Article IV
referring to Congress "was intended to provide [Congress] the
means of giving to ... [sister state judgments] the conclusiveness of
judgments upon the merits, when it is sought to carry them into
judgments by suits in the tribunals of another state," 8 thereby sug-
gesting that Congress has been given the power to set up the mech-
anism whereby the Clause can be effectuated. On this interpretation
of the Effects Clause, Congress would not have the power to lessen
the faith and credit to be given to sister state judgments.
Another interpretation of the Effects Clause has been offered
which also implies that Congress would lack the power to lessen
full faith and credit. Some have interpreted the phrase "Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof" 9
to mean that Congress can prescribe the manner and effect of the
proof of sister state judgments. 0 Thus, Congress has been given
the power to mandate the system by which judgments would
be authenticated and establish the effect of that proof (presumably,
" See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFUCTS LAW § 79, at 182 (The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc. 1968) ("The last sentence of the full faith and credit clause, authorizing
the Congress to prescribe by general law "the effect' of sister state judgments, permits
that body to provide by statute for a general registration of judgments procedure to be
administered in state courts, whereby a judgment of one state, upon registration in an-
other state (without new action or new service of process) would be at once enforceable
by execution or otherwise on the same basis as judgments of the second state."); see
also ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFuCTS LAw (3d ed. 1977); Rex Glensy, The Extent
of Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 137,
164 (1997) ("To avoid the confusing, intricate, and somewhat contorted way of enforcing
sister state judgments, the enabling provision was meant for Congress to enact a statute
providing for registration of state judgments.").
16 See LEFLAR, supra note 15, § 73, at 144-45 (1977) ("The procedure of bringing a
new action in a second state on a judgment previously rendered, after full litigation of
issues or opportunity therefor, is slow, clumsy, and sometimes ineffectual.").
17 LEFLAR, supra note 15, § 73, at 144-45 (1977).
Is M'Elmoyle, 38 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
'9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
10 See STORY, supra note 14, § 1303.
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the effect of the proof would be that the judgments would now be
viewed as authenticated and therefore entitled to full faith and
credit).
Each of these competing interpretations of the Effects Clause
has its weaknesses. The interpretation in which Congress is to pre-
scribe the manner and effect of the proof of sister state judgments
seems to involve a tortured reading of the constitutional text. When
the phrase "the effect thereof" is used, the effect must be an effect
of something. In the phrase "the Manner in which such Acts, Re-
cords and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof," the
effect presumably is either of the "Manner" or of the "Acts, Records,
and Proceedings."" However, neither of those corresponds to the
"proof." Similarly, the interpretation in which Congress is empow-
ered to set up the mechanism (manner) whereby sister state judg-
ments will be given effect nonetheless relies on a particular inter-
pretation of the kind of procedural effect Congress is to prescribe.
Congress is to regulate whether an individual will have to go to
court in a state in order to have a judgment from a sister state en-
forced. However, Congress is not to regulate whether a sister state
judgment is to be conclusive on the merits. The interpretation in
which Congress can prescribe the amount of full faith and credit to
be given sister state judgments seems to involve the most natural
reading of the constitutional text since it would seem unnecessary
to add that Congress has the power to prescribe the effect of the
manner. For example, had "and the effect thereof" not been added,
Congress presumably would still have had the power to say that
only acts, records and judgments proven in a particular manner
would be subject to full faith and credit. Further, as a historical
matter, the "thereof" was substituted for "which judgments obtained
in one state, shall have in another."22 However, insofar as the tex-
tual interpretation allowing Congress to prescribe the effects of acts,
records, and judicial proceedings would allow Congress to lessen
21 See Timothy Joseph Keefer, DOMA as a Defensible Exercise of Congressional
Power under the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635, 1655
(1997) (discussing these two options).
22 See James M. Patten, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: How Congress Said
'No' to Full Faith and Credit and the Constitution, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 939, 946-
47 (1998) (citing WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 255 (1987)); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of Marriage
Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1454-
55 (1997).
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the full faith and credit which is due, it contradicts the textual re-
quirement in the previous sentence that full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the judgments of the courts of sister states.
2. The Better Interpretation
To decide which interpretation is the most accurate, it may be
helpful to consider how Congress has in fact exercised its power
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, especially insofar as those
attempts have been endorsed by the Supreme Court. Congress first
exercised this power by specifying that authenticated acts, records,
and judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Posses-
sions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Terri-
tory or Possession from which they are taken."23 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this to mean that each state must treat the
judgment of a sister state as it would be treated in the state in
which the judgment was rendered.24 If the judgment is not subject
to modification in the state rendering it, then the judgment is not
subject to modification in any other states.21 If the judgment is sub-
ject to modification in the state rendering it, then it is subject to
such modification elsewhere,26 absent additional legislation to the
contrary.27
Great difficulties can arise, however, if sister states are permit-
ted to modify judgments which were modifiable in the rendering
state. For example, consider custody decrees, which generally are
modifiable in the decree-granting state. Absent legislation to the
contrary, such decrees are modifiable in sister states as well. As the
Court explained in Thompson v. Thompson, 28 "[blecause courts
entering custody orders generally retain the power to modify them,
2' See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663 (1998) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1996)).
24 See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 547 (1947).
See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663-64 ("A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a
court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the
judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.').
26 See LEFLAR, supra note 15, § 73, at 169 (1968) ("if a judgment lacks conclusive
effect in the state where it was rendered, it will not be conclusive elsewhere either,
.. o. .1.•
27 See discussion of Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act infra note 37 (discussing
Congressional legislation which increased the faith and credit due custody decrees).
28 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
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courts in other States were no less entitled to change the terms of
custody according to their own views of the child's best interest."29
If sister states are permitted to modify custody decrees, parents
who have lost a custody battle in one state will have an incentive to
kidnap their children and relitigate the issue in a different forum.3"
Confronted with this possible scenario, states adopted their own
versions of the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA)31 which had been developed in an effort to avoid these
jurisdictional conflicts. 32 However, even after states had adopted
this Act, there remained great confusion, both because some states
had refused to enact their own version of the UCCJA 33 and be-
cause those enacting it had modified the Act. 4 Thus, the incentive
for noncustodial parents to kidnap their children and travel to cer-
tain states3 to petition for a change in custody was preserved.36
Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
("PKPA") 37 to limit the right of states to modify sister states' custody
decrees, thereby removing the incentive for parents to take their
children to a different jurisdiction to relitigate custody.38 Had Con-
gress not acted, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not have
been a bar to sister states modifying the (modifiable) judgments of
the original decree-granting states since the Full Faith and Credit
Clause "obliges States only to accord the same force to judgments
2 Id. at 180.
31 See id. While some courts might view those who kidnap their children with a
jaundiced eye, other courts might favor those individuals (who had become residents of
the state) over individuals residing elsewhere.
3' UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1988) (specifying
the conditions under which a state will have jurisdiction to make or modify a custody
determination).
32 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181.
3 See Melanie Togman Sloan, No More Baby Jessicas: Proposed Revisions to the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 355, 357 (1994) (discuss-
ing states that had not adopted the Act).
See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181.
3 See Sloan, supra note 33, at 357 (By 1979, the eleven states that had not adopt-
ed the UCCJA "had become sanctuaries in which kidnappers could live with their kid-
napped children.") (citation omitted)).
36 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181.
37 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (1988).
" See Murphy v. Woemer, 748 P.2d 749, 750 (Alaska 1988) ("When the UCCjA
proved an imperfect remedy for the staggering national problem of parental child-snatch-
ing and forum shopping in interstate child custody disputes, Congress enacted the PKPA
to provide a uniform federal standard to ascertain the one state with jurisdiction to
modify an existing child custody order.").
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as would be accorded by the courts of the State in which the judg-
ment was entered."39 Thus, when the Baker Court said that a "final
judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory
authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judg-
ment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land,"4" the Court
was not claiming that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that
modifiable judgments like custody decrees be given more credit in
sister states than in the decree-issuing state.
Congress' passage of the PKPA has import for determining the
appropriate interpretation of the congressional power under the
Effects Clause. If Congress has the power to prescribe only whether
a registration system will be set up, then it would seem that Con-
gress would not have had the power to increase the full faith and
credit due to a custody judgment by saying that a sister state will be
precluded from modifying a judgment which is nonetheless modifi-
able by the decree-granting state.
Two different responses might be made to the claim that
Congress' passage of the PKPA strongly suggests which interpreta-
tion of the Effects Clause is correct: (1) Congress does not have the
power to pass the PKPA under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
although it might well have such a power under the Commerce
Clause,4 or (2) Congress does have the power to pass the PKPA
under the Effects Clause, because it is seeking to increase rather
than to decrease full faith and credit and thus does not run afoul of
the constitutional provision that full faith and credit be given.
The first response is possibly true, although the Court in
Thompson v. Thompson 2 gave no hint that there was any difficul-
ty43 in Congress' passage of the PKPA under the Effects Clause."
For example, the Court described the PKPA as an "addendum to the
full faith and credit statute"45 without a hint that this was a consti-
tutionally suspect exercise of congressional power. Further, the
3' Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).
o Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663-64 (1998) (emphasis added).
4 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
42 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
41 See id. at 177, 180-81.
44 See Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Act in Defense of Mar-
riage and the Constitution, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 279, 297 n.115 (1997) [hereinafter Lov-
ing the Romer Out for Baehr] (Author's LEXIS search of the briefs filed in Thompson v.
Thompson, 488 U.S. 174 (1988), did not reveal that either petitioner or respondent
discussed the constitutionality of the PKPA.).
41 See Thompson v. Thompson, 488 U.S. 174, 183 (1988).
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Court discussed the significance of "Congress' full faith and credit
approach to the problem of child snatching," 46 at least implicitly
suggesting that this was a valid approach to solving the problem at
hand.
In contrast, there are several reasons to believe that the second
response rather than the first is correct. Consider Congress' first
exercise of power under the Effects Clause.47 There, Congress did
not set up a registration system but, instead, prescribed that judg-
ments will have the same effect in sister states that they have in the
rendering state.48 Courts have spoken approvingly of that exercise
of power. For example, in Thompson v. Whitman,49 the Court de-
scribed that Act of Congress as carrying the Full Faith and Credit
Clause into effect.5" Even the Baker Court endorsed the constitu-
tionality of that Act of Congress, describing it as pursuant to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.51 Thus, it seems at best implausible to
claim that Congress does not have the power under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to increase the credit which is due to sister state
judgments.
3. The Power to Decrease Faith and Credit
When interpreting Congress' power under the Effects Clause,
several issues should be separately analyzed. One issue is whether
Congress has merely been empowered to set up a registration sys-
tem or, instead, to regulate how much credit will be due to a sister
state's judgment. If the latter, then an additional question is whether
Congress has the power to decrease the amount of credit due, not-
withstanding the explicit constitutional requirement that full faith
and credit be given. To date the Supreme Court has not determined
whether Congress has the power to lessen full faith and credit 2 as
Congress has never attempted such an act.
4 Id. at 182.
41 See Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122.
48 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
49 85 U.S. 457 (1873).
' See id. at 461. (The court is discussing the Act of Congress of May 26, 1790 in
which Congress prescribed the effect that authenticated records and judicial proceedings
of one state would have in the courts in the rest of the country.).
5! See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663 (1998).
52 See Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REv. 604, 635 (1997).
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The Supreme Court has, however, hinted at its position. For
example, the Court in Davis v. Davis suggested that Congress had
"rightly interpreted the clause to mean not some but full credit,"s3
implying that a different interpretation would have been an
incorrect interpretation of the constitutional requirement.
In addition, in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 4 the
Court noted that "it is quite clear that Congress' power in this area
is not exclusive, for this Court has given effect to the Clause beyond
that required by implementing legislation.""5 Thus, when interpret-
ing the Constitution to determine the obligations the Full Faith and
Credit Clause imposes on the states, the Court does not appear to
feel constrained to limit those obligations to those imposed by
Congress. If both the Court and Congress have the power to give
effect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, it is unclear
what would happen if those two powers were to come into conflict.
One possibility is that the Court would always defer to Congress. 6
Yet, Court dicta indicates that this would not always occur.
The Court has suggested that Congress can exceed the require-
ments imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and impose
additional full faith and credit obligations.5 7 As discussed above,
Congress can require that even judgments modifiable in the decree-
granting state be given full faith and credit in sister states under
certain conditions. 8 On the other hand, it is not at all clear that
the Court would hold that Congress can reduce the requirements
imposed by the Clause. 9
In Williams v. North Carolina,6" the Court refused to express a
view regarding whether Congress had the power to create excep-
s Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
448 U.S. 261 (1980).
Id. at 272-273 n.18.
16 Cf. Larry Kramer, The Public Policy Exception and the Problem of Extra-Territorial
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REv 153, 158 (1996) [hereinafter
The Public Policy Exception] ("'Whatever limits the Supreme Court imposes in interpreting
'full faith and credit' are only federal common law, similar to Supreme Court decisions
under the dormant Commerce Clause. As such, they can be over-ridden by Congress.').
I" See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 273 n.18 ("Congress clearly has the power to increase
the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the laws or judgments of
another State . . .
18 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing PKPA).
59 See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 273 n.18 (there is 'some question whether Congress
may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this Court.);
see also Chabora, supra note 52, at 635 (supporting ratchet view).
317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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tions to the obligations imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause
when divorces granted in sister states were at issue.61 However,
the Court did note that uthe considerable interests involved and the
substantial and far-reaching effects which the allowance of an ex-
ception would have on innocent persons indicate that the purpose
of the full faith and credit clause . . . would be thwarted to a sub-
stantial degree"62 were such exceptions permitted. Similarly, the
Court in Sherrer v. Sherrer noted that the fact "[t]hat vital interests
are involved in divorce litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of
greater rather than lesser importance that there should be a place to
end such litigation."63 These comments at least suggest that the
Court would hold unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to modi-
fy the Full Faith and Credit Clause by making sister state divorce
decrees not subject to full faith and credit guarantees. For example,
suppose that Congress were to pass an amendment to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause authorizing states to refuse to recognize divorces
which would not have been permitted under local law. States
which had fault-only divorce laws would be entitled to refuse to
recognize no-fault divorces issued in other states, even if such a
refusal would make subsequent contracted marriages bigamous. The
Supreme Court would likely hold such a congressional enactment
unconstitutional. The Court would not simply be saying that such a
modification would be bad public policy but that such a modifica-
tion would contradict the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and would violate the Constitution itself.
B. On Giving Full Faith and Credit to Laws
The text of the Constitution and accompanying congressional
legislation state that judgments and legislative acts shall receive
parallel treatment.6 Text notwithstanding, however, the Baker
Court explained that Supreme Court "precedent differentiates the
credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to
61 See id. at 303.
62 Id. at 303-04.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948).
See Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective
Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L.
REv. 95, 95 (1984) ("The parallel treatment of judgments and legislative acts is evi-
dent.").
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judgments." One explanation for this apparent infidelity to the
constitutional and legislative text proposes that statutes and judg-
ments are not really being treated differently and that laws are ap-
propriately analogized to modifiable judgments.
Legislative acts seem to be modifiable in that legislatures can
repeal or amend those statutes which have already been enacted.66
Arguably, if legislative acts can be made and remade at will by the
legislature of the state whose law is at issue, then it is not clear why
any other state should be bound by such laws.67 On this analysis,
just as before the passage of the PKPA sister states did not have to
accept or enforce the original decree-granting state's judgment con-
cerning custodial rights, so, too, sister states do not have to accept
or enforce another state's laws, absent some sort of additional
legislation requiring that full faith and credit be given.
Although initially appealing, this analysis is misleading. Sup-
pose, for example, that State A's law is incorporated within the state
constitution and thus cannot be changed at the whim of the legisla-
ture. Suppose further that a court in State B must decide whether to
subordinate State B's law to State A's in a particular case. When
making this decision, the State B court will not consider whether
State A's legislature can change the law or even whether or how
easily State A's constitution can be changed but, instead, will deter-
mine whether State A's law violates an important public policy of
State B's.68 Thus, the decision whether to give a sister state's law
full faith and credit will not be based upon how readily the sister
state's law can be changed but upon whether that law is obnoxious
to the forum's public policy.69
The difference between the obligations imposed by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause with respect to other state's judgments and
with respect to other state's statutes can be illustrated by consider-
ing how some states treat gambling debts. Suppose that an indi-
vidual borrows money to pay for chips at a gambling casino.7"
65 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663 (1998).
66 See Brilmayer, supra note 64, at 98.
67 Id.
I See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE LI. 1965, 1970 (1997) [hereinafter Same-Sex Marriage]
(discussing the public policy exception which involves a violation of the forum state's
strong public policy).
69 See id.
70 See M & R Invs., Co. v. Hacker, 511 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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Suppose further that the casino sues the individual in its home state,
the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter,7
and that judgment is entered in favor of the casino. The casino then
files suit in the individual's home state to have the judgment en-
forced. The Full Faith and Credit Clause would require that the
latter state enforce the judgment, even if enforcement of gambling
debts violated that state's public policy.72 Because the debt would
have been reduced to judgment, the latter state would not have the
option of pleading the public policy exception. As the Baker Court
explained, there is "no roving 'public policy exception' to the full
faith and credit due judgments."7
Suppose that the example is a little different. The casino tries to
enforce the gambling debt by suing the individual in his home state.
However, the individual's home state has already made clear that
the enforcement of gambling debts is obnoxious to an important
public policy.74 Notwithstanding that the debt would be valid in
the state in which it was incurred, the court might nonetheless
refuse to enforce the debt as a matter of public policy.7'
Consider Florida, a state in which certain types of gambling are
considered against public policy.76 A gambling debt of a prohib-
ited type would be enforceable in Florida, for example, if a judg-
ment had been entered in a different jurisdiction and the individual
who was owed the money then litigated in Florida arguing that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause required that the judgment be en-
forced. Public policy could not be used to preclude enforcement of
that valid judgment. However, if the case was originally heard in
Florida, public policy might preclude enforcement of that gambling
debt.77 As the Court explained in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
71 See id. at 1099.
72 See id. at 1100-1101; see also Coghill v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 396 S.E.2d
838 (Va. 1990) (Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that New Jersey judgment involv-
ing payment of gambling debt be enforced, notwithstanding Virginia's strong public
policy prohibiting the enforcement of such debts).
71 See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 664 (1998) (citing Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)).
1 See Barquin v. Flores, 459 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
75 See id. at 436-37; see also Casanova Club v. Bisharat, 458 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1983)
(refusal to enforce gambling debt valid where incurred).
76 See Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jemigan, 202 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) ("the public policy of the State of Florida is established to permit a restrict-
ed type of gambling which is incidental to spectator sports. This State has consistently
refused to permit gambling on non-spectator sports such as bookie parlors, football par-
lors, et cetera.').
77In MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEx MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 104
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Hunt,78 the Full Faith and Credit Clause demands recognition of a
judgment, "even though the statute on which the judgment was
founded need not be applied in the state of the forum because in
conflict with the laws and policy of that state."7 9
Merely because the law of a foreign state differs from the law
of a forum state is not sufficient to justify the forum's invocation of
the public policy exception. The Supreme Court has noted that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to submit to "hostile
policies" of other states "because the practical operation of the
federal system, which the Constitution designed, demand[s] it."
80
Indeed, it is "when a clash of policies between two states emerges
that the need of the Clause is the greatest."8' Thus, the mere fact
that two state statutes differ does not establish that the statute of the
former would be obnoxious to the latter's public policy. For exam-
ple, although Florida might refuse to enforce gambling debts validly
incurred in other jurisdictions, a different state might enforce such
debts, even if such debts could not have been validly incurred in
that state.82 Thus, the public policy exception does not allow the
forum state to refuse to enforce other states' laws merely because
their laws conflict, although it does allow the forum state to refuse
to enforce a law which is contrary to one of its important public
policies.83
(1997) [hereinafter LEGALLY WED] and Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr
Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 319-20 n.49 (1997)
[hereinafter Judicial Good Faith], there is an attempt to offer an example of a judgment
which did not have to be enforced because it was contrary to the public policy of the
enforcing state. The example should have involved a gambling debt .reduced to judgment
rather than a gambling debt not reduced to judgment. Of course, the Baker Court has
made clear that such a judgment would have to be enforced in a sister state, public
policy of the enforcing state notwithstanding.
7 320 U.S. 430 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980); see also Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663 (As the Baker Court
explained, Supreme Court 'precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative
measures and common law) and to judgments.").
7 Magnolia Petroleum Co., 320 U.S. at 439.
See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
" Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 42 (1949).
82 See Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254
N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964) (gambling debts enforceable under Puerto Rican law are enforceable
in New York); see also Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland, 307 A.2d 85 (NJ. 1973).
1 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918)
(,The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judg-
es, to suit the individual notion of expediency or faimess. They do not close their
doors, unless help would violate some deep-rooted fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition in the common
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Justice Frankfurter in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt suggested that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause incorporated a public policy exception
for sister states' judgments too, arguing that "exceptional circum-
stances may relieve a State from giving full faith and credit to the
judgment of a sister State because 'obnoxious' to an overriding
policy of its own."' However, this obnoxiousness exception was
to be read narrowly and, even in his view, states were not permit-
ted to ignore foreign judgments merely because the states disagreed
with the policies underlying those judgments. States might have to
submit "even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another
State""5 and, thus, a mere policy conflict would not establish that ajudgment of one state would be obnoxious to the public policy of
another.86 Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter implied that in limited
circumstances a state would be permitted to refuse to honor a judg-
ment issued in a sister state on public policy grounds. This implica-
tions was in direct conflict with the Baker Court which denied the
existence of a "roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and
credit due judgments."87
The Baker Court distinguished between final judgments and the
"practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mecha-
nisms for enforcing judgments."88 The Court stated, "[e]nforcement
measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive
effects do; . . . ," suggesting that the enforcement measures "remain
subject to the even-handed control of forum law."8" For example,
the statute of limitations of a forum state might bar recovery of a
debt arising from a judgment in a different state. As explained in
weal.").
" Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 426 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). See also Pacific Employers Ins. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493, 502 (1939) ("It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some
limitations upon the extent to which a state may be required by the full faith and credit
clause to enforce even the judgment of another state in contravention of its own statutes
or policy."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFUCTS OF LAW §103 (1971) ('A judgment
rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a
sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the national policy of
full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference with important
interests of the sister State."). But see William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith
and Credit, 53 MD. L. REv. 412, 438 (1994) (it is quite doubtful that Section 103
provides an accurate statement of the law.").
85 Estin, 334 U.S. at 546.
86 See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 162-163 (1932).
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M'Elmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen,9' "the statute of limitations may
bar recoveries upon foreign judgments"9 because "the effect in-
tended to be given under our Constitution to judgments is that they
are conclusive only as regards the merits; .... Thus, unless a
suit upon a judgment is "brought within the period prescribed by
the local law, . . . the suit will be barred."
9 3
Several other exceptions exist to the requirement that full faith
and credit be given. For example, "a want of jurisdiction over either
the person or the subject-matter"94 would entail that a court issuing
a decree would not have had the power to issue that decree and
thus that decree would not be subject to a full faith and credit obli-
gation.9" As the Williams Court explained, "A judgment in one
State is conclusive upon the merits in every other State, but only if
the court of the first State had power to pass on the merits-had
jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment."96 Where a court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, its judgment
must be accorded full faith and credit in all of the states.
C. The Purposes Behind the Full Faith and Credit Clause
To understand which requirements are imposed by the Clause,
itself, it is important to understand the purposes of the Clause. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause is a "nationally unifying force"97
which makes the individual states "integral parts of a single na-
tion."98 Indeed, the Constitution "in no small measure brings sepa-
rate sovereign states into an integrated whole through the medium
of the full faith and credit clause."99 However, this integration can-
90 38 U.S. 312 (1839).
9' Id. at 328.
92 Id.
9' Id. But see Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586, 627 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that M'Elmoyle had been overruled by
Wolfe); id. at 629-30 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that if M'Elmoyle had not been over-
ruled, then "an Ohio private corporation's laws [must] have a higher constitutional stand-
ing than an Ohio law or judgment would have . . . .).
94 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
91 See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948) ("A judgment of a court having no
jurisdiction to render it is not entitled to the full faith and credit which the Constitution
and statute of the United States demand.').
96 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).
Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
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not occur unless states surrender some of their independence. As
the Sherrer Court explained, if in the application of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause "local policy must at times be required to give
way, such 'is part of the price of our federal system." '"c
The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to "resolve
controversies where state policies differ."1"' The Clause does not
merely direct states to take into consideration that a judgment had
been issued in another state's judicial proceeding, as if once that
were done the state would have the right to ignore that judgment.
On the contrary, the "very purpose of the full faith and credit clause[is] to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created ... by thejudicial proceedings of the others .... ."
Even without the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states would still
be able to recognize their sister states' judgments out of comity, just
as can be done for judgments which have been issued in foreign
countries." 3 However, as the Williams Court explained, "the Full
Faith and Credit Clause puts the Constitution behind a judgment in-
stead of the too fluid, ill-defined concept of 'comity.""' Comity is
not a matter of absolute obligation, and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause substitutes a "command for the earlier principles of
comity." 05
The Full Faith and Credit Clause forces states to surrender their
local policies for the sake of the federal union. Indeed, the space
which has been "left for the play of conflicting policies is a narrow
one," 106 since otherwise the Clause could not fulfill its proper
role. Perhaps it would seem that the Full Faith and Credit Clause as
thus conceived is rather constricting. However, as Justice Rutledge
suggested, "If the impairment of the power of the states is large, it is
one the Constitution itself has made."107 While it is not clear what
Justice Rutledge would have said in a case in which Congress had
100 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 342, 355 (1948) (citing Williams I, 317 U.S. at 302).
101 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 (1947).
102 Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 276-77.
" The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to judgments of foreign countries.
See Golden v. Golden, 68 P.2d 928, 932 (N.M. 1937).
104 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945).
100 See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
'1 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 294 (1942) (quoting
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935)).
107 Williams II, 325 U.S. at 254 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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lessened the full faith and credit requirements, °8 he did suggest
that the "very function of the clause is to compel the states to give
effect to the contrary policies of other states when these have been
validly embodied in judgment," and that "[tlo this extent the Consti-
tution has foreclosed the freedom of the states to apply their own
local policies.""
Justice Robert H. Jackson, in fact, suggested that the Constitu-
tion "created a political union among otherwise independent and
sovereign states."" ' The Full Faith and Credit Clause was incorpo-
rated within the Constitution to "guard the new political and eco-
nomic union against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in
jurisprudence.""' Such a goal can only be accomplished if the
judgments of sister states are not subject to trumping by local public
policy.
Yet, as discussed infra, it might be argued that provincialism in
jurisprudence is not a worry since Congress is authorizing the states
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages if they so desire. Further,
the Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to prescribe the
manner in which acts, records and judicial proceedings will be
authenticated and the effect thereof. Yet, the question at hand is
whether Congress is authorized to decrease the full faith and credit
which is due. Congress claims that it has the authority, but Congress
is not the final arbiter of what the Constitution prohibits or permits.
The Supreme Court has indicated in a different context that it is
unwilling to allow Congress to define its own powers. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,"' the Court suggested, "If Congress could define
its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning,
no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, un-
changeable by ordinary means.' It would be 'on a level with ordi-
nary legislative acts, and, like other acts, . . . alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.' "' 3 The Court was unwilling to
declare that Congress had the power to pass the Religious Freedom
,o See id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (basing his interpretation on 'the terms of the
Constitution and the Act of Congress implementing them .... .
10 Id.
"I Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (1945).
III Id.
112 521 U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
"3 See id. at 2168 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
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Restoration Act of 1993,114 notwithstanding the Fourteenth
Amendment's explicit allocation to Congress of the "power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."'15
The Court explained, "Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what the right is.""' 6
Any analysis of Congress' power under the Full Faith and Cred-
it Clause must take into account the spirit of the City of Boeme
Court's comments." 7 Just as Congress does not enforce a constitu-
tional right by changing what it is, Congress would hardly be giving
effect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause by changing what the
Clause requires.
D. Choice of Law
The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to enforce the
judgments of sister states' courts, as long as those courts had the
requisite jurisdiction to render judgment initially. The Clause impos-
es a less stringent requirement if those conditions have not been
met. As discussed earlier, states are permitted to refuse to enforce
obligations validly incurred in other states if those obligations have
not been reduced to judgment and if enforcement of those obliga-
tions would be obnoxious to an important public policy."8
When discussing what the Full Faith and Credit Clause re-
quires, commentators are sometimes explaining the limitations it
imposes on which state's law may be applied to a particular oc-
currence or transaction. This issue must be differentiated from
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires, for example, that
a forum enforce a debt validly incurred elsewhere. The former is
determined by inquiring whether a particular state had enough of a
connection to the parties and the transaction or occurrence at issue
to justify application of that state's law, whereas the latter is deter-
mined by inquiring whether the enforcement would violate an
important public policy of the forum.
114 42 U.S.C. 2000bb (1994).
115 See U.S. CONST. amend. XiV § 5.
116 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at __, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
117 But see Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 68, at 2002 (suggesting that
Congress' power under the Effects Clause is more like its power under the dormant
Commerce Clause than the Fourteenth Amendment).
"a See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
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Suppose that a resident of Minnesota buys an insurance policy
from an insurance company in Wisconsin. One evening, the Minne-
sota resident is driving in Wisconsin when a Wisconsin resident
who has had several drinks crosses the double yellow line in the
center of the road, has a head-on collision with the Minnesota
driver, and kills him. The Minnesota driver's widow tries to collect
the insurance proceeds due her. However, it turns out that the
amount she will collect will depend upon whether Minnesota or
Wisconsin law is applied, and she will be entitled to more insur-
ance proceeds if the former law is applied." 9 The widow goes to
court in Minnesota where she lives and sues the insurance compa-
ny, claiming that she is entitled to the more generous benefits pro-
vided by Minnesota law. The Minnesota court applies Minnesota
law, and the widow is awarded greater benefits.
Both Minnesota and Wisconsin had significant contacts to the
occurrence. The accident occurred in Wisconsin, involved a Wis-
consin driver, and the insurance company was based in Wisconsin.
The innocent party was a Minnesota resident, the insurance policy
was bought while the individual was a resident of Minnesota, and
the individual's widow still lived in Minnesota. The issue here was
not whether one state's law was obnoxious to an important public
policy of another, but merely whether the different states (Minneso-
ta and Wisconsin) each had sufficient contacts with the event at
issue to have its own law applied. Under this scenario, each state
would have more than sufficient contacts with the parties and the
event to justify application of local law.
E. Choice of Law Rules
As a general matter, choice of law is a difficult and confusing
area. 2' An additional complicating factor is that a number of dif-
ferent questions might be asked when examining choice of law, and
the failure to carefully identify the relevant question might yield
inaccurate answers. For example, it is important to distinguish be-
tween two different questions: (1) what is the best rule for deciding
which law should be applied,' and (2) which choice of law rules
"' This case is based on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) although
the facts have been changed to make even clearer that either state's law might be ap-
plied.
120 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U.
PA. L. REv. 949, 1030 (1994) (discussing choice of law 'chaos').
121 Jackson, supra note 110, at 24 ("Where there is a choice under the full faith and
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are required by the Constitution.122 Merely because some choice
of law rules are thought non-optimal or unwise does not render
them unconstitutional. 123 Further, it would be a mistake to think
that there is only one "wise" choice of law rule. There is no uni-
versal agreement about which choice of law system would be best,
and different scholars offer different approaches.124 Several com-
mentators suggest that certain approaches are not only inferior but.
unconstitutional. 2 ' However, the Supreme Court has been unwill-
ing to declare that any allegedly unconstitutional approach actually
violates constitutional guarantees. 126
The Court has explained that there are minimal constitutional
limits on which state's laws are applicable to a particular occur-
rence or transaction. For example, "if a State has only an insignifi-
cant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction,
application of its law is unconstitutional."'27 However, the Court
has failed to make sufficiently clear how minimal those contacts
must be,'28 having recognized that "it is frequently the case under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply
either the law of one State or the contrary law of another."' 29
credit clause, the one should be made, I should say, which best will meet the needs of
an expanding national society for a modem system of administering, inexpensively and
expeditiously, a more certain justice.').
122 Id. at 16 ('1 think it difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more
completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of a
legal character than in trying to determine what choice of law is required by the Consti-
tution.').
'23 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1988).
124 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (offering a
sophisticated territorialist approach); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL L. REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966) (discussing the better
rule of law criterion); David E. Seidelson, Resolving Choice of Law Problems Through
Interest Analysis in Personal Injury Actions: A Suggested Order of Priority Among Com-
peting State Interests and Among Available Techniques for Weighing Those Interests, 30
DuQ. L. REV. 869 (1992) (offering interest analysis approach).
1" See John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173, 187 (1981) (suggesting that interest analysis is constitu-
tionally suspect); Laycock, supra note 124, at 312 (suggesting that better rule of law
theory is constitutionally suspect).
12 See Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 728-29 ('long established and still subsisting choice-
of-law practices that come to be thought, by modem scholars, unwise, do not thereby
become unconstitutional.').
'z Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (footnote omitted).
128 See id. at 334-38 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the insignificant contacts
which the Court nonetheless held were sufficient).
12 Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 727.
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Some commentators have concluded that, as a general matter, the
forum state can apply its own law without much fear of being
overturned on constitutional grounds."'
Nonetheless, it would be implausible to claim that a state can
always apply its own law, since that would undermine the
Constitution having constrained state powers to create a federal
system.131 The Court has recognized that "the statute of a state
may sometimes override the conflicting statute of another, both at
home and abroad,"'32 that is, in some cases states must apply a
sister state's law. Regrettably, the Court has refused to offer explicit
guidelines to help establish when a state is permitted to apply its
own law, believing it "unavoidable" that in particular cases the
Court will be forced to "determine for itself the extent to which the
statute of one state may qualify or deny rights asserted under the
statute of another."
33
F. Choice of Law in the Marital Context
In the context of marriage and divorce, decisions about which
state's law is applicable are relatively clear, in part because of the
importance of the implicated interests. For example, a divorced
individual who remarries might be charged with bigamy if the di-
vorce is not recognized. 34  An individual whose marriage was not
recognized might lose a variety of rights including the right to inher-
it,'35 the right to have custody of a child,13 6 the right to bring
3 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL
L. REV. 683, 719.
131 Jackson, supra note 110, at 26 (Such a policy would "be at odds with the impli-
cation of our federal system that the mutual limits of the states' powers are defined by
the Constitution.").
132 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 548
(1935) (emphasis added).
Id. at 547.
' Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287, 289 (1942) ("Petitioners
were tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation under § 4342 of the North Carolina
Code, 1939, and each was sentenced for a term of years to a state prison.") (footnote
omitted).
135 See In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dep't 1993)
(surviving partner in same-sex relationship not allowed to elect against will as surviving
spouse); Dismuke v. C & S Trust Co., 407 S.E.2d 739, 740 (Ga. 1991) ('Having deter-
mined that appellant had not established the existence of a common-law marriage be-
tween her and the decedent, . . . appellant was not an heir at law of the decedent.").
13 See In re Guardianship of Sedelmeier, 491 N.W.2d 86, 87 (S.D. 1992) ('In legal
contests between a parent and a non-parent for the custody of a child the threshold
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certain actions in tort, 137 etc.
Most courts and commentators agree that the recognition of
marriages validly celebrated in other states involves a choice of law
question because the law of more than one state is potentially appli-
cable when the ceremony takes place.1 31 Certain states have a sig-
nificant interest in whether a particular marriage will be recognized:
the state or states where the parties are domiciled, the state where
the marriage ceremony is performed, and the state where the cou-
ple plans to live immediately after they are married. The laws of any
of these states might be applied to determine the validity of a mar-
riage. However, because such important interests are at stake when
the validity of a marriage is at issue, clear rules have been estab-
lished for determining which states law will apply to determine the
validity of a particular marriage.
The First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws suggests that "a
marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law
of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied
with."139 However, the Restatement lists some exceptions. Section
132 reads:
Marriage Declared Void by Law of Domicil
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party,
though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been
complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their
marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,
(c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are
at the domicil regarded as odious,
question is: Is the parent unfit to have custody of the child? ... Without unfitness
being established, there is no necessity to look to the best interests of the child.").137 See Denil v. Integrity Mutual Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986)
(unmarried partner may not bring an action for loss of consortium).
" Robert Cordell 11, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and an
Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 247, 265 (1994) ('Mhe decision to honor a marriage from another state,
especially a marriage which conflicts with the laws in the state deciding, involves a
choice of laws question.); C.W. Taintor II, What Law Governs the Ceremony Incidents
and Status of Marriage, 19 B.U. L. REv. 353, 367 (1939) (Since the question of the
creation of the marriage status must be referred to the law of some state or to the laws
of two states acting together, the problem is one of choice of law.").
139 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE CONFUCT OF LAws § 121 (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT].
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(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void
even though celebrated in another state. 4"
Comment c is no longer applicable because the Supreme Court
has held that no state may prohibit interracial marriage.' Howev-
er, the remaining exceptions ensure that a marriage will be valid
unless it is polygamous, incestuous, or declared void by the
domicile.
The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws suggests a
similar policy, since a "marriage which satisfies the requirements of
the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of an-
other state which had the most significant relationship to the spous-
es and the marriage at the time of the marriage."' 42 Both Re-
statements suggest that a marriage valid where celebrated will be
valid everywhere unless the marriage would be treated as void in
the domicile,'43 although the Second Restatement formulation
may include one exception.
Suppose that Wanda Williams and Trent Thomas are domiciled
in one state, celebrate their marriage in another state, and then
immediately move to a third state where they expect to spend the
rest of their lives. Arguably, the third state has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and marriage at the time of the marriage
because that is where the marital couple will permanently reside.
The Second Restatement suggests that if the union is void according
to the law of the state which will be the couple's domicile
immediately after the marriage, then the marriage may not be valid.
According to the First and Second Restatements, the only states
whose law might be applicable to determine the validity of a mar-
riage are the states where the parties are domiciled before the mar-
riage, the state where the marriage is celebrated, and the state
where the couple will live after they have married. Because the
states whose laws might be applicable are limited in this way, the
parties will know whether their marriage will be valid. They can
make plans and have justified expectations based on their knowl-
'4 Id. at § 132.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283, at 233 (1969).
143 For a discussion of why "violates the strong public policy' is equivalent to "void,'
see STRASSER, LEGALLY WED, supra note 77, at 111-12 & n.48-51. See also FIRST RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 139, § 132 cmt. b (describing void marriage as one which offends
strong policy of the state).
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edge that because their marriage was valid according to the laws of
the relevant states, their marriage will be recognized throughout the
United States.
States might declare a marriage void144  or voidable141 or,
perhaps, merely prohibited. 46 The general rule for the validity of
marriages is that only marriages void in the domicile will be invalid
when validly celebrated in another state. 47  As the Court ex-
plained in Loughran v. Loughran,141 "Marriages not polygamous or
incestuous or otherwise declared void by statute will, if valid by the
law of the State where entered into, be recognized as valid in every
other jurisdiction."'49 When the Loughran Court was discussing
the statute declaring the marriage void, the Court was referring to
the statute of the domicile. In the very next sentence, the Courtpointed out that the "mere statutory prohibition by the State of the
domicile"' would not "invalidate a marriage solemnized in an-
other state in conformity with the laws thereof."'.' As the Court
explained in Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer'. 2 "[M]arriage
looks to domicil." 5 3
A different question may arise when assessing which domicile's
law should determine the validity of a marriage. For example, sup-
"4 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (1991) (incestuous marriages void).
145 See CAL FM. CODE § 2210 (West 1994) (voidable marriages include underage
marriages and those obtained by fraud).
11 A marriage might be prohibited if it did not meet certain formal requirements of
the state. Cf. Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92, 94 (9th Cir. 1951) (discussing the
"formal requirements of the laws of the state of residence relating to such matters as the
essential recitals of the marriage certificate, authorization to issue the license and per-
form the ceremony, and similar details.).
147 There is an exception to this rule if the domicile has an evasion statute which
specifies that domiciliaries' marriages which are prohibited (rather than void) in the
domicile will not be recognized even if validly celebrated elsewhere. See Strasser, Judi-
cial Good Faith, supra note 77, at 354-358; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (West
1993) which provides:
If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is
disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state
goes into another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or
declared void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all
purposes in this state with the same effect as though it had been entered into
in this state.
4 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
149 Id. at 223 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
, Id. (emphasis added).
Isi Id. (footnote omitted).
152 267 U.S. 544 (1925).
3 Id. at 551.
[Vol. 64: 1
1998] BAKER ON DOMA AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT JURISPRUDENCE 333
pose that one of the parties to a marriage were to become domi-
ciled in a state twenty years after having celebrated that marriage in
a different state. Suppose further that the new state declared the
party's marriage void. Would the marriage of the past twenty years
be treated as void and of no legal effect because the new domicile
of one of the parties treated it as void? Both the First and the Sec-
ond Restatements, as discussed supra in Part L.F, determine the
validity of a marriage by looking at the domicile at the time of the
marriage or, perhaps, immediately following the marriage. This way,
marital status can be established early and with certainty. Important
rights involving family or property will not suddenly be destroyed
years after the wedding has taken place without the parties having
had notice at the time of the marriage that the validity of their mar-
riage might be in doubt. Individuals can make plans and have rea-
sonable and justified expectations about their marriage and about
how they might go about living their lives.
Perhaps it would seem that the analysis here cannot be correct
because an individual married in State A may move twenty years
later to State B and be divorced under State B's law.'54 Yet, a di-
vorce is different from an annulment, since the latter may involve a
marriage being declared void and of no legal effect, notwithstanding
the marriage having been valid under State A's law.' In the latter
case, the Anonspouse" might be held to have had no property rights
resulting from the twenty-year marriage.'" It is somewhat un-
clear, however, whether the Supreme Court would affirm such a
holding. In this regard, Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt s7 may be
instructive.
In Vanderbilt, the Court held that while a state could grant a di-
vorce even if it did not have jurisdiction over one of the spouses,
the state could not determine the property rights of the spouse over
'4 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945) ('he
domicil of one spouse within a State gives power to that State .. . to dissolve a mar-
riage wheresoever contracted.").
155 See Commonwealth ex rel. Knode v. Knode, 27 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1942) ("A decree of annulment . . . declares that the marriage was void from the very
beginning.'); Southern Ry. Co. v. Baskette, 133 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tenn. 1939) ("The
legal effect of the judgment in the annulment suit was to render this voidable marriage
a nullity-that is, judicially declare that it never had been a legal and lawful marriage.").
15 Such a "nonspouse" might be treated as a putative spouse. See, e.g., CAL FAM.
CODE § 2251 (West 1994) (discussing division of property when putative spouse in-
volved).
157 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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whom it did not have jurisdiction.' s8 Were a state able to treat a
marriage as void notwithstanding that union having been valid in
the states of celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage,
the state might not only be dissolving the marriage but affecting
property rights, custody rights, etc.159 The Court might well look
askance at such a result.
Similarly, in Maynard v. Hill,6' the Court quoted with ap-
proval a decision by the Supreme Court of Connecticut upholding
the constitutionality of that state's divorce law.'"" The Connecticut
court had worried that if it struck down the law as unconstitutional,
it could have caused "consequences easily conceived but not easily
expressed, such as bastardizing the issue and subjecting the parties
to punishment for adultery."6 2 Were states able retroactively to
nullify unions valid in the states of celebration and domicile at the
time of the marriage,"6 3 they might cause children to have only
one legal parent rather than two and might subject couples to
criminal punishment.6 4
II. DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE AcT ("DOMA") AND COVENANT MARRIAGES
Congress claimed to be exercising its power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause when it passed the Defense of Marriage
Act, which denounces same-sex marriages. Should Hawaii or some
118 Id. at 419 (I[t]he Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife's
right to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New
York to give it recognition.' (footnote omitted)).
"' See Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 68, at 2000 (DOMA 'expressly au-
thorizes states to ignore even judgments involving the marital rights or status of a same-
sex couple. All bets are off for these people, and no divorce decree, property settle-
ment, or adoption is safe.").
'6 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
See id. at 207-08 (quoting Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541 (1831)). The state's divorce
law was challenged on the ground that it violated Article I, § 10 of the Constitution
which prohibits states from passing laws which impair contractual obligations.
162 Id. at 208.
163 A different question would be presented were the marriage void or voidable at
the time of celebration because then the parties would be on notice that their marriage's
validity was in doubt. See Strasser, Judicial Good Faith, supra note 77, at 354; cf. Willis
L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 952, 954-
55 (1977) (to the extent possible, the choice of law rules applicable to marriage should
be clear and precise so that the parties may be able to foretell with fair confidence
what law will be applied to their relationship.').
164 Insofar as a state had a sodomy statute which had an exception for married cou-
ples, couples might be subject to prosecution if their marriages were not recognized.
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other state recognize same-sex marriages, the constitutionality of the
Act will be challenged. Even if held unconstitutional, however, it
may be for reasons which have nothing to do with whether Con-
gress has the power to lessen the credit due to sister state judg-
ments. 6' That power may not be tested until a law is passed
which, for example, exempts certain divorce decrees from full faith
and credit.66 At that time, the Court may be forced to address this
issue squarely, if it has not done so already.'
67
A. DOMA
The Defense of Marriage Act reads in relevant part:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding
of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim
arising from such relationship."'
There are certain ambiguities to this Act. Because it does not
mention choice of law anywhere, it is unclear whether a state
which has adopted the Second Restatement will be entitled to not
recognize a marriage which had been valid in the states of cele-
bration and domicile at the time of the marriage.' 69 Arguably,
such a state would be required under its own choice of law rules to
apply the other states' laws to determine the validity of the
marriage. 70
6I See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition
of Punishment: On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Con-
straints, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227 (1998) (suggesting that DOMA violates Bill of Attainder
guarantees). For an argument suggesting that Colorado's Amendment 2 violated bill of
attainder guarantees, see generally Akhill Reed Amar, Essay, Attainder and Amendment
2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203 (1996).
166 In the alternative, the Act might be challenged on equal protection grounds. In
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Supreme Court struck down Colorado's
Amendment 2 at least in part because the amendment raised 'the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is bom of animosity toward the class of persons affected.'
See id. at 634. A similar analysis might be offered here.
167 But see infra notes 232-244 and accompanying text (suggesting that due process
guarantees might prevent Congress from enacting such legislation).
168 See Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (emphasis added).
169 As discussed earlier, the Second Restatement looks to the laws of the domicile at
the time of the marriage or immediately following the marriage in order to determine
the validity of that marriage.
17' See Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr, supra note 44, at 294-96; see, e.g.,
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Some commentators suggest that, rather than merely expanding
the possible choice of law options for each state, DOMA involves
Congress imposing its own choice of law rules which supersede
those of the individual states. 71 However, there are reasons to re-ject that analysis. First, members of Congress claimed that DOMA
did not change state law 72 and merely "reaffirm[ed] current prac-
tice and policy."73 Had Congress supplanted state law with feder-
al law, one could hardly claim that current practice and policy had
not been changed. Second, if Congress had wanted to include
choice of law rules, it would have done so. For example, when it
passed the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 74 it
included a provision regarding choice of law. 7 Third, it is un-
clear what these federally imposed choice of law rules would be,
and courts would simply have to guess. 76 For example, would
subsequent domiciles be allowed to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages if those unions were void there? Prohibited there? Would
nondomiciles be allowed not to recognize such marriages? Under
what conditions?
While DOMA may affect how and whether marital property is
distributed or support payments are made, a much different worry is
suggested by the Act which may render domestic relations law
somewhat complicated. Suppose that Hawaii comes to recognize
same-sex marriages. Suppose further that Lynn and Kim, a same-sex
couple domiciled in Hawaii, marry there. A few years into the mar-
riage, Lynn decides that she no longer wants to be married to Kim
and goes to Georgia to start a new life.
In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974) (applying Second Restatement
rules to determine which state's law should be applied in assessing the validity of a
particular marriage).
171 See, e.g., Kramer, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 56, at 158 (suggesting
that DOMA involves a "federal choice-of-law rule.")
1 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S4870 (daily ed. May 8, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Nickles) ("This bill does not change State law").
173 Id.
174 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994).
17 28 U.S.C. § 17388(g). 28 USCA § 1738B(h) suggests that to establish, modify, or
enforce a child support order, the forum state's law will apply except that (1) the issu-
ing state's law will apply with respect to the duration of the payments and (2) in an
action for arrears under a child support order, the statute of limitations will be either
that of the forum or that of the issuing state, whichever is longer.
176 See Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr, supra note 44, at 305-06 (discuss-
ing different possible choices); cf. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991) (advocating that
federal choice of law rules be drafted for certain kinds of disputes).
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After Lynn has abandoned her, Kim files for divorce in Hawaii.
Suppose that Kim is granted the divorce. Under DOMA, Georgia
would be entitled to refuse to recognize that divorce. Suppose
further that Lynn goes to court in Georgia to have her marriage to
Kim declared null and void and gets a judgment to that effect.177
One issue would involve the division of marital property. According
to Hawaiian law, there might be marital property to be divided, al-
though Georgia might refuse to recognize any property division
imposed by the Hawaiian courts. Thus, suppose that Lynn had with-
drawn from the bank a substantial amount of money which had
been earned during the marriage. According to Hawaiian law, this
would be marital property subject to division,"78 although DOMA
would permit Georgia to refuse to enforce a judgment from a
Hawaiian court to that effect.
This hypothetical would have been even more complicated if
child support was at issue, since courts would then have to decide
how to reconcile DOMA with the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Act.79 DOMA would suggest that rights to child support
incident to a divorce would not have to be enforced whereas the
Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Act would suggest
otherwise. 8'
Suppose that Lynn seeks to have the Georgia child support
judgment given full faith and credit in Hawaii. It is unclear whether
Hawaii would have to give credit to that judgment. Georgia would
not have to give effect to a judgment in Hawaii because Hawaii
would be treating such relationships as marriages. DOMA exempts
'7 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (1996 & Supp. 1998) (Any marriage entered
into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state
or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state.')
11 See Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Haw. 1986) (marital property to
be divided according to what is just and equitable) (citing Au-Hoy v. Au-Hoy, 590 P.2d
80 (Haw. 1979)).
17 See Strasser, Loving the Romer Out of Baehr, supra note 44, at 321-322 (discuss-
ing how this might be resolved). In Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904), the Court
suggested that courts should not assume that Congress intends to make the law a means
of avoiding support obligations. Id. at 77. Presumably, the Court would not interpret
DOMA to permit avoiding those obligations unless such an interpretation was 'positively
required." Id.
1, If, for example, the child and parent continued to live in Hawaii and Kim does
not consent to Georgia having jurisdiction to make the modification, then the Georgia
court would not have jurisdiction to modify the support decree. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738B(e)(2) (1996). Instead, the appropriate authorities would have the obligation to
enforce the decree. Id. § 1738B(a)(1).
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states from the usual obligations imposed by the Clause when the
other state treats "a relationship between persons of the same
sex ... as a marriage." However, DOMA would not give Hawaii
the same opportunity to reject Georgia's judgment, because Georgia
does not treat such relationships as marriages. Presumably, a court
would rule that the Georgia judgment would not be binding in Ha-
waii,' although that might depend upon whether DOMA was
interpreted to have any bearing on how that issue should be
resolved.
When DOMA permits states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages validly celebrated elsewhere, it does not say that only
future domiciles have that option-the Act read literally would
entitle any state not to recognize such marriages. Yet, it is not at all
clear that such a broad grant of authority to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages will pass constitutional muster. 8 2
In other contexts, the Court has suggested that full faith and
credit guarantees would be violated by Congress granting such
broad authority to the states. In Order of United Commercial Travel-
ers of America v. Wolfe,'83 the Supreme Court decided whether
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required a South Dakota court to
give effect to a provision of the constitution of a fraternal benefit
society, when that provision was valid under the law of the state of
incorporation, Ohio, but not the law of South Dakota.'84 The
Court pointed out that "interwoven with [the] ... financial rights
and obligations" which members of such fraternal organizations
have, "they have other common interests incidental to their mem-
berships, which give them a status toward one another that involves
more mutuality of interest and more interdependence than arises
from purely business and financial relationships." 8 ' The Court
18 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287, 307 (1942) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ('It is indisputable that the Nevada [divorce] decrees ... were
valid and binding in the state where they were rendered [i.e., Nevada].'); see also
Tougas v. Tougas, 868 P.2d 437, 447 (Haw. 1994) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not require a state to give credit to a foreign judgment which is in opposition to
an earlier judgment issued in that state's own courts.).
182 But see Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 68, at 2000 (suggesting that exist-
ing law permits this).
331 U.S. 586 (1947).
See id. at 588-589.
185 See id. at 605-606.
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analogized the relationship to one involving a marriage and suggest-
ed that just as the law of the domicile governs the marriage, the law
of the state granting the incorporation must prevail. 86
The question is why such laws "must prevail." The Court im-
plied that it would be unfair to apply South Dakota's rather than
Ohio's law because all of the society members' rights had to be
determined by a single law.'87 Insofar as such a fairness claim im-
plicates due process concerns,'88 then Wolfe would at least sug-
gest that due process guarantees might be violated by not having
the law of the state of incorporation prevail. However, the Court
likened the state of incorporation to the marital domicile. This sug-
gests by analogy that not having the domicile's law govern the
marriage might have due process implications. The limits imposed
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause are identical to those imposed
by the Due Process Clause.'89 Congressional amendment of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause would not affect the constitutional
limitations on which state's law may be used when the validity of a
marriage valid in the states of celebration and domicile is at issue if
those limits are imposed by the Due Process Clause since the limita-
tions imposed by the Due Process Clause would not be affected by
Congress having modified the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If in-
deed the law of the domicile governs the marriage as a constitution-
"6 Id. at 606; see also Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551
(1925) ("The act of becoming a member [of a fraternal beneficiary society] is something
more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding relation, and as mar-
riage looks to domicil, membership looks to and must be governed by the law of the
State granting the incorporation."); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green,
237 U.S. 531 (1915) (law of state of incorporation must prevail).
"87 See Wolfe, 331 U.S. at 606 (quoting Modem Woodmen of Am-. v. Mixer, 267
U.S. 544, 551 (1925)).
1" See International Shoe v. Washington Office of Unemployment Compensation and
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (due process implicates "traditional conceptions of
fair play and substantial justice . . .
189 See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: A Very Well-Curried Leflar Approach, 34 MER-
CER L. REv. 731, 751 (1983) (suggesting that the Court's view seems to be that "the full
faith and credit clause places no other limitations on a state forum's choice of law than
those imposed by the due process clause."); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limi-
tations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2
(1981) (suggesting that the limitations imposed on the states by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause with respect to their choice of law rules are identical to the limitations imposed
by the Due Process Clause).
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al matter, 9 ' that would suggest that a state which is not the
domicile of either party cannot invalidate the marriage. 9 '
Certainly, there are differences between the society discussed
in Wolfe and natural persons who might marry. For example, the
latter are protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause while
the former may not be. 92 However, such a difference would mili-
tate in favor of states being unable to treat as void those marriages
which were valid in the states of celebration and domicile at the
time of the marriage because of such additional protection. Cer-
tainly, individuals would be deterred from travelling to a state
which would refuse to recognize those individuals' marriages as a
price of admission to that state. It is not at all clear that the
Constitution permits states to charge such an admission price.'93
In Crandall v. Nevada,'94 the Court struck down a Nevada
law in which persons were charged a dollar for the right to exit the
state. 9  In Shapiro v. Thompson," the Court struck down a
Connecticut law because the purpose of inhibiting migration into
the state was constitutionally impermissible.'97 If Crandall and
Shapiro involved impermissible interferences with the right to travel,
" A separate and different question would be involved if the individuals married in
a foreign country rather than a sister state. Here, the discussion is limited to only those
individuals who have married in the United States.
191 Professor Silberman suggests that choice-of-law rules may require that (assuming
Hawaiian comes to recognize same-sex marriages) a same-sex marriage celebrated by Ha-
waiian domiciliaries be recognized as valid by other states. See Linda J. Silberman, Can
the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federal-
ism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 191, 202 (1996). The same rule should apply wher-
ever the individuals are domiciled at the time of marriage as long as that domicile treats
the marriage as valid.
192 See Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945) (suggesting that
nonnatural persons are not protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Natural
persons, and they alone, are entitled to the privileges and immunities which Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment secures.); Michael G. Collins, 'Economic Rights, Implied
Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEo. LJ. 1493, 1547 (1989)
(Privileges and Immunities Clause limited to natural persons).
193 But see Seth F. Kreimer, Territoriality and Moral Dissensus: Thoughts on Abortion,
Slavery, Gay Marriage and Family Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 161, 182 (1996) (1 am
afraid a federal system which vests domestic relations power in the states means precise-
ly that migrants sacrifice legal advantages in their state of origin when they seek to
exercise their rights to travel or migrate.).
194 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
19s Id. at 39, 46.
1"6 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
197 Id. at 631-33.
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so too would a state requirement mandating one to give up the
legal recognition of one's marriage as a price of admission to a
neighboring state.198
B. Judgments and Laws
Various states have enacted statutes which not only declare
same-sex marriages void but also that such marriages will not be
recognized even if recognized in another state.'99 For example,
consider the Georgia statute declaring, "No marriage between per-
sons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits
of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex
pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign
jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state."2' One inter-
pretation of this statute is that Georgia will refuse to recognize such
a marriage of its domiciliaries even if that marriage is validly cele-
brated elsewhere. Suppose that Hawaii comes to recognize same-
sex marriages. Suppose further that two individuals of the same sex
who are domiciled in Georgia go to Hawaii to marry. Georgia
might refuse to recognize that marriage validly celebrated in Ha-
waii. However, interpreted this way, Georgia would not be entitled
to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage of individuals subse-
quently moving to the state if that union was recognized by the
individuals' domicile at the time of the marriage because only the
same-sex marriages of Georgia domiciliaries would be considered
void.
"A different interpretation of that statute would be that Georgia
would refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage which was recog-
nized by the states of celebration and domicile at the time of the
marriage. Thus, Georgia would have declared that regardless of
I See Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr, supra note 44, at 306-313; Thomas
M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47' STAN. L. REV. 499, 508-510 (1995) (discussing
right-to-travel implications of same-sex marriage bans).
' See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 1998); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 101(a),(d) (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (1996 & Supp. 1998); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (1997 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (Supp. 1997).
2 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996 & Supp. 1998); see also MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-1-1(2) (Supp. 1998) (Any marriage between persons of the same gender is prohib-
ited and null and void from the beginning. Any marriage between persons of the same
gender that is valid in another jurisdiction does not constitute a legal or valid marriage
in Mississippi.).
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where the individuals were domiciled at the time of their same-sex
marriage, that union would not be recognized by Georgia. Notwith-
standing that the state would have had no contacts with the parties
or the marriage at the time of celebration, the state would nonethe-
less refuse to recognize the marriage. It is not at all clear, however,
that it would be constitutional for a state to reserve such a power
for itself.2' 1
A separate question would be whether the state could refuse to
permit the enjoyment of the incidents of such a marriage. Thus,
merely because a state recognizes the validity of a marriage does
not entail that the state must permit the couple in question to enjoy
all of the benefits of marriage." 2 Yet, it should not be thought that
states are utterly free to refuse to permit the enjoyment of the inci-
dents of marriage whenever they so choose. If a state were to pre-
vent same-sex couples from cohabiting03 but subjected no other
married couple to that limitation, equal protection guarantees would
be implicated.2
C. Declaratory Judgments
Suppose that Hawaii comes to recognize same-sex marriages
and that DOMA is found unconstitutional on grounds which do not
establish that there is a fundamental right to marry a same-sex part-
ner.20" Even without DOMA, states might adopt choice of law
rules allowing them to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages valid-
ly celebrated elsewhere.06 Assuming that such laws would pass
201 See supra notes 184-199 and accompanying text.
2 See Silberman, supra note 191, at 202 (recognizing the validity of marriage does
not entail that the state must permit couples to enjoy the incidents of marriage).
203 See id. at 204 (suggesting that the new domicile would be free to prevent the
same-sex couple from cohabiting).
2(' Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (striking Amendment 2 of the
Constitution of Colorado, in part, because it 'singl[ed] out a certain class of citizens for
disfavored legal status or general hardships .. . .). Id.
25 For a discussion suggesting that the fundamental right to marry does include the
right to marry a same-sex partner, see Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence
and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and
Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 921, 951-80 (1995); see also Mark Tamney,
The Defense of Marriage Act: A 'Bare Desire to Harm' an Unpopular Minority Cannot
Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 99, 99
(1997) (suggesting that DOMA interferes with the fundamental right of gays and lesbians
to marry).
Some states passed laws indicating that they would not recognize same-sex mar-
riages validly celebrated elsewhere even before DOMA was passed. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
[Vol. 64: 1
1998] BAKER ON DOMA AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT JURISPRUDENCE 343
constitutional muster," 7 there might nonetheless be a way to pre-
vent states from refusing to recognize such marriages. One sugges-
tion which has been made is that same-sex couples could get de-
claratory judgments affirming the validity of their marriages.08
Declaratory judgments may be issued when "an actual contro-
versy has existed which requires a judgment to determine legal
rights and relations."2 9 Where marital status is in doubt and there
is some dispute as to whether two individuals are (or were) married
to one another,21" an individual might want a legal declaration of
"his marital status in order to determine his future conduct,"211
e.g., whether he is still free to marry.212
A declaratory judgment can have the force and effect of a final
judgment,21 although there is some controversy whether a declar-
atory judgment would be subject to full faith and credit.214 The
STAT. § 51-1.2 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
207 But see supra notes 184-199 and accompanying text.
I See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister
States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law
Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr
v. Lewin, 32 1. FAM. L. 551, 588-89 (1994); Julie L. B. Johnson, The Meaning of "Gen-
eral Laws': The Extent of Congress's Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1628
(1997); Jon-Peter Kelly, Act of Infidelity: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unfaithful
to the Constitution, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 217 (1997); Rebecca S. Paige,
Wagging the Dog-If the State of Hawaii Accepts Same-Sex Marriage Will Other States
Have to?: An Examination of Conflict of Laws and Escape Devices, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
165, 173 (1997).
1 Demorest v. DiPentima, 324 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Mich. App. 1982).
210 See id. at 635.
211 Id. at 636.
212 Sometimes, a dispute about marital status, e.g., whether a valid common law
marriage had in fact been contracted, will determine who will be entitled to inherit. See
Smith v. Winder (In re Winder's Estate), 219 P.2d 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (woman held
not to have had common law marriage and thus not to have been precluded from mar-
rying deceased); In re Danza, 188 A.D.2d 530, 591 N.Y.S.2d 197 (2d Dep't 1992)
(woman not entitled to elect against will because she was held not to have entered into
common law marriage with deceased).
213 See Wall v. Wall, 534 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. 1987) ("a declaration as to the validity
of a marriage, pursuant to section 206 of the Code, would be final . . .).
214 See Habib A. Balian, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to
Marital Status, 68 S. CAL L. REv. 397, 406 (1995) (suggesting that it is not clear wheth-
er declaratory judgments would be entitled to the same full faith and credit as are other
decrees). But see Henson, supra note 208, at 588-89 (suggesting that declaratory judg-
ment would be entitled to same full faith and credit as is afforded to other judgments);
Johnson, supra note 208, at 1628 (suggesting that but for DOMA, declaratory judgments
would have to be given the full faith and credit due other judgments); Kelly, supra note
208, at 217 (suggesting that declaratory judgments would be subject to full faith and
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Baker Court suggested, "[t]he Court has never placed equity decrees
outside the full faith and credit domain."215
Two different kinds of scenarios should be distinguished. In the
first scenario, a couple from a state declaring same-sex marriages
void travels to a state recognizing such marriages, marries, and then
seeks a declaratory judgment from a court in the celebratory state
that their marriage is valid.216 Assuming that the celebratory state
follows the First or the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,
the court should consult the domicile's law to determine whether
the marriage is treated by the domicile as void or whether the domi-
cile has an evasion statute. If, for example, the domicile would treat
the marriage as void and of no legal effect, the forum court should
rule that the marriage is invalid, notwithstanding its validity in the
celebratory state.217 Otherwise, individuals could always evade the
domicile's marital laws by simply going to a celebratory state which
recognized the marriage and then getting a declaratory judgment
that the marriage was valid.218
The above scenario should be distinguished from one in which
a same-sex marriage is valid according to the laws of the states of
celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage. A same-sex
couple might still seek a declaratory judgment, either because they
were planning on moving to a state which refused to recognize
such marriages or because the couple would be travelling through
such a state.219 Arguably, notwithstanding both members of the
couple claiming to have a valid marriage, an actual controversy
would still be posed because the new state would have a statute on
the books precluding recognition of such marriages.220 Assuming
credit); Paige, supra note 208, at 173 (suggesting that but for DOMA, declaratory judg-
ments would be considered subject to full faith and credit guarantees).
215 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 664 (1998).
216 See Henson, supra note 208, at 588 (suggesting this scenario).
217 A separate question would be raised if the court in the celebratory state miscon-
strued, in good faith, the domicile's law and declared the marriage valid. In that event,
the judgment would seem subject to full faith and credit guarantees. Cf. Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) ('[A]s the jurisdiction of the Missouri court is not open
to dispute the judgment cannot be impeached in Mississippi even if it went upon a
misapprehension of the Mississippi law.).
218 Some commentators suggest that individuals could nullify the domicile's laws in
this way. See Henson, supra note 208, at 588-89; Kelly, supra note 208, at 217; Paige,
supra note 208, at 174.
219 See Kelly, supra note 208, at 203, 218.
22 See Kelly, supra note 208, at 203, 218. But see David P. Currie, Full Faith and
Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 7, 11 (1997) (suggesting that insulating a ruling
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that the forum state followed either the First or the Second Restate-
ment of the Conflict of Laws, the court would declare the marriage
valid, because the states of celebration and domicile at the time of
the marriage had recognized the union. It would not matter that
there were other states (having no relation to the parties or the
marriage at the time of the marriage) that would not recognize the
union.
If Hawaii or some other state recognizes same-sex marriages
and if DOMA is challenged and held constitutional, the above
analysis would be inapplicable because Congress would have creat-
ed an express exception to the normal operations of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Absent DOMA, however, subsequent domiciles
would seem obligated to give full faith and credit to a declaratory
judgment specifying that a same-sex marriage was valid.
D. Covenant Marriages
Recently, Louisiana passed legislation creating a new form of
marital union "a covenant marriage," which is more difficult to
dissolve than a conventional marriage.22' For purposes here, the
question is whether other states should restrict the grounds of di-
vorce for those who have entered into covenant marriages to those
grounds specified in the relevant statute.222
Currently, states are not required to refuse to grant no-fault
divorces to domiciliaries who had celebrated a covenant marriage
in Louisiana. That divorce decree would be entitled to full faith and
credit. As explained in Williams v. North Carolina 23 "when a
court of one state acting in accord with the requirements of proce-
dural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled in that
state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse," that decree
will not "be excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely
because its enforcement or recognition in another state would con-
"from judicial reexamination in the absence of a meaningful opportunity-even in theory-
to contest the order in the original proceeding would be difficult to reconcile with the
rule of law.").
221 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (West Supp. 1998) (listing exclusive grounds for
divorce). A covenant marriage is a special form of legally recognized marriage where
couples may only obtain a divorce if certain specified grounds can be established.
22 Thus far, relatively few couples have signed up for covenant marriages. See Joan
Kirchner, Preacher Legislator Wants Georgia to Allow Covenant Marriages, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., Jan 3, 1998, at 11A.
m Williams 1, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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flict with the policy of the latter."224 Assuming no fraud of lack of
jurisdiction, the "decree of divorce [would be] a conclusive
adjudication of everything. 225
A different issue would be whether a state court could estop an
individual who had entered into a covenant marriage from seeking
a divorce on grounds other than those specified in the relevant stat-
ute. 226 For example, suppose that an individual had entered into a
covenant marriage but had then abandoned his wife. The individual
might be estopped from seeking a divorce until he and his wife had
been separated for two years, 2 even if the individual had met the
residency requirement, had established domicile, and would other-
wise have been entitled to secure a divorce. Of course, the court
would not be obligated to prevent such an individual from divorc-
ing his wife,228 and the court might be precluded by the Due Pro-
cess Clause from forever preventing the individual from getting a
divorce if, for example, he had come from a state which had only
allowed the party not at fault to seek a divorce.229
Some commentators have suggested that Congress pass a law
requiring that "the grounds for divorce that are effective in the
couple's domicile at the time of execution ... be honored by other
states."23 Yet, it must be remembered that states might not only
provide their domiciliaries with an option to enter into a covenant
marriage but might, instead, enact fault-only divorce legislation.
224 Id. at 303.
225 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945).
226 Courts sometimes use estoppel in the domestic relations context. See, e.g.,
Spellens v. Spellens, 317 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1957) (en banc) (husband estopped from ques-
tioning validity of his marriage to wife); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 261 P.2d 269 (Cal. 1953)
(en banc) (husband estopped from attacking validity of divorce decree); Henley v.
Houck, 200 N.E.2d 99 (III. App. Ct. 1964) (ex-wife collaterally estopped from challeng-
ing divorce decree); Attebery v. Attebery, 111 N.W.2d 553 (Neb. 1961) (husband es-
topped from challenging divorce from wife); Raspa v. Raspa, 504 A.2d 683 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (husband estopped from challenging validity of marriage); Watson v.
Watson, 270 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. App. 1980) (former wife estopped from challenging valid-
ity of foreign divorce decree).
227 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(5) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring separation for
two years).
228 See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personaliz-
ing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 496-97 (1998) (suggesting that a subsequent
domicile would be free to ignore the divorce law of the state in which the marriage
had taken place).
2 See infra notes 237-248 and accompanying text (suggesting that a permanent pro-
hibition on remarrying might violate due process guarantees).
" See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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While the proposal to use the marital domicile's divorce law was
made in the context in which the married couple had agreed to be
bound by those laws, it would be quite foreseeable for Congress to
pass a law specifying that the divorce law in the marital domicile be
applied regardless of whether the couple had opted for more strin-
gent divorce requirements.23' Further, such a proposal would en-
tail that an individual who had married in a state which allowed no-
fault divorce would nonetheless be bound by his or her domicile's
fault-only divorce law. Various undesirable consequences might
result from such a law, e.g., more unhappy couples staying together
with negative consequences for their children232 or charades in
court where one spouse falsely admits to being at fault or the other
spouse falsely testifies about his or her spouse's fault in order to
secure a divorce.233
Commentators have further suggested that if marriages were
treated as involving contracts rather than a kind of status, then the
law of the state where the marital "contract" was made should be
applied.234 The issue of concern here is whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause might be used to affect which state's divorce law
would be applicable to a particular divorce, bracketing the wisdom
of changing the current system.
Suppose that Congress were to mandate that states must give
full faith and credit to the domestic relations law of the state where
"I It might be argued that the couple had opted for those more stringent require-
ments by choosing to many while domiciled in a state which, for example, only al-
lowed fault-based divorces.
212 See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing. experts who take the posi-
tion that children are better off if the unhappy couple divorces since it would be harm-
ful for the children to be around when the parents were in a constant state of warfare).
11 See J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Ex-
periments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 2 (1997) (discussing "the scripted
courtroom behavior of most divorcing wives and husbands [who] played scenes from an
adversary theater of the absurd. Wives usually breathlessly testified to their husbands'
domestic beastliness, while their spouses almost always passed up their right to respond,
many waiting outside the courtroom door for their freshly divorced ex-wives to bring
them the good news of the liberating decree they had conspired to obtain.").
3 See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 228. The authors suggest that were marriage
treated like other contracts, states would honor the contract's specifications unless con-
trary to local public policy. See id. at 496-97. This need not allow individuals to set up
their own rules or even to opt for the divorce law of a different state. See id. at 499.
Rather, it might be understood to specify that the law of the state where the marriage
was contracted would be applied. For an additional argument suggesting that the law of
the state where the marriage was contracted should be applied, at least with respect to
the validity of the marriage, see supra notes 183-191 and accompanying text.
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the marriage was contracted at the time it was celebrated.23 The
question here is whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
permit such an enactment. While such an act would involve in-
creasing rather than decreasing the credit which was due and would
not involve Congress impermissibly reducing full faith and cred-
it,236 there are some fatal weaknesses inherent in this approach.
First, the Court has interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause
as imposing greater obligations with respect to sister states' judg-
ments than sister states' laws, notwithstanding Congress having
made no such distinction.237 If the Constitution requires that such
a differentiation be made, then Congress would be precluded from
increasing the credit due to sister states' marital laws in this way.
Second, substantive due process guarantees might be implicated if
such a rule would preclude an individual's opportunity to remarry
in the future.238
In Zablocki v. Redhail 9 the Court examined a Wisconsin
statute limiting the remarriage rights of noncustodial parents who
were behind in their child support payments. 4 The Court held
the statute unconstitutional, in part, because certain individuals
would be "absolutely prevented from getting married" by that stat-
ute.24' The Court thereby suggested that statutes which in effect
bar individuals from marrying or remarrying must shoulder a heavy
burden of persuasion.242 Fault-only divorce laws may in effect bar
individuals from ever (re)marrying, either because neither spouse
might be willing to act "wrongly" or because the innocent spouse
might be unwilling to seek a divorce.
" This might create administrative difficulties and be an unwise policy. For exam-
ple, courts might be in the position of having to learn the intricacies of the divorce
laws of the various states.
See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
Of course, the individual would only be so precluded if the law of the marital
domicile so precluded that individual, in which case the divorce law of the marital
domicile would also seem constitutionally infirm. This might mean, for example, that a
state would be precluded by the Constitution from reserving divorce for only innocent
spouses.
9 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
240 Id. at 375.
241 Id. at 387.
242 See id. at 383 (since right to marry is fundamental, critical examination of the
state interests advanced in support of the classification would be required).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to marry is
"one of the vital personal rights2 43 essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness."244 Of course, this does not mean that states are pre-
cluded from regulating marriage. "To the contrary, reasonable regu-
lations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed."2 45 Howev-
er, when a classification "significantly interferes" with the right to
marry, the Court will critically examine "the state interests advanced
in support of the classification."24 The Zablocki Court made clear
that when a "statutory classification significantly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests.
247
It is simply unclear whether states have sufficiently important
state interests to justify precluding individuals from divorcing (and
thus being able to remarry) unless fault can be shown. If indeed
such statutes would not be constitutional, this would have impli-
cations both for those states considering making their divorce stat-
utes much stricter and for any attempt to apply those statutes
wherever an individual may travel.
Certainly, it might be argued that no-fault divorce is of compar-
atively recent vintage;248 thus, states can, of course, reenact fault-
only divorce laws should they so desire. However, fault-only di-
vorce laws were not examined in light of contemporary substantive
due process jurisprudence and, as Justice Powell noted in his
Zablocki. concurrence, the previous laws might no longer pass
constitutional muster.249
243 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
24 See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (recognizing a constitutionally
protected interest in marriage in the prison context).
211 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
216 Id. at 383.
247 Id. at 388.
21 See Martin Zelder, The Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law
on the Divorce Rate, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Vy 241, 241 (1993) ('Almost all Ameri-
can states adopted a no-fault divorce statute during the 1970's.').
249 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
(State regulation has included bans on incest, bigamy, and homosexuality, as
well as various preconditions to marriage, such as blood tests. Likewise, a
showing of fault on the part of one of the partners traditionally has been a
prerequisite to the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling state
purpose" inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the
States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce.).
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CONCLUSION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that full faith and
credit be given to sister states' judgments and has authorized Con-
gress to pass statutes to give effect to that requirement. Congress is
thereby empowered not only to set up a registration system but also
to prescribe the amount of credit due, as long as Congress does not
attempt to circumvent the explicit constitutional requirement that
full faith and credit be given. Because of that explicit requirement,
DOMA is unconstitutional.
It is unclear whether Congress has also been authorized to
increase (but not decrease) the credit due to sister states' Acts. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
require that less credit be given to acts than to judgments, although
the Court has never made clear whether Congress can legislatively
overrule that interpretation. Perhaps federalist principles incorporat-
ed within the Constitution would preclude Congress from forcing
states to be subservient to sister states' divorce laws in certain cir-
cumstances, although that is controversial. What is less controversial
is that states must respect the minimal due process guarantees sur-
rounding marriage. When states refuse to recognize a marriage
which is valid according to the laws of the states of celebration and
domicile at the time of the marriage, they attempt to exempt them-
selves from the constitutional constraints which protect the rights of
all citizens.
Our current constitutional system involves a careful balancing
of the powers of the states with respect to each other and with
respect to the federal government. Fundamental individual interests
must be given their due weight whenever the powers of the states
or the federal government are discussed. Were DOMA upheld as
constitutional or were states allowed to ignore marriages which
were valid in the states of celebration and domicile at the time of
the marriage, the design of our current federal system would be
undermined, making the United States more like a federation of
sovereign states than a constitutional democracy. Further, were
states allowed to preclude individuals from exercising the funda-
mental right to marry without establishing the sufficiently important
state interests that would thereby be promoted, the equal protection
and due process guarantees would be eviscerated. Such attempts to
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undermine our constitutional framework must be rebuked. Other-
wise, there will be "consequences easily conceived but not eas-
sily expressed" 2 °---the destruction of families, the harming of
children, and the undermining of basic human freedoms.
250 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 208 (1888) (quoting Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn.
541 (1831)).

